A B C D E F
G H I J K L M 

Total read books on site:
more than 10 000

You can read its for free!


Text on one page: Few Medium Many
29, appendix to the Revised Statutes,
that the several chapters composing the Revised Statutes shall be
deemed and taken as one act.

It is evident that if a woman should practice law without a
license, recover for her services, and be sued for three times
the amount, that under Sec. 11 of Chap. 11 for practicing law
without a license, it would be no defense for her to say that the
masculine pronoun was used in this section.

Section 3 of our Declaration of Rights, says "that all men have a
natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God," etc. It
will not be contended that women are not included within this
provision.

The 8th section declares "that no freeman shall be imprisoned or
disseized of his freehold," etc., but by the judgment of his
peers or the law of the land. Will woman be deprived of the
guarantees in this section and the right of trial by jury because
the masculine pronoun is used? Under the 11th section no man's
property can be taken or applied to public use without the
consent, etc. Is not the property of a woman as secure under this
provision as that of a man? In the chapter upon forcible entry
and detainer, the masculine pronoun is used throughout, but no
court would hesitate for a moment in holding a woman to be within
its provisions if she should wrongfully hold possession of
premises.

In the whole Chancery Code of this State, consisting of 53
sections, the word woman, female, she, her, herself, or any other
feminine pronouns are not to be found, while in the 5th, 8th,
15th, 18th, 19th, 24th, 25th, 26th, 27th, 28th, 29th, 30th, 31st,
36th, 37th, and 46th, and some others, the masculine pronouns
frequently occur. The same construction that would exclude a
woman from the provisions of the statute in regard to the
admission of attorneys, would place her without the Chancery
Code. Yet no respectable attorney would claim because defendants
in chancery are represented in the law by masculine pronouns,
that a woman could not be made a defendant in chancery.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

MYRA BRADWELL.


COMMUNICATION FROM THE COURT.

No order having been entered or opinion filed in this case, on
the seventh of October the applicant received from the court,
through Hon. Norman L. Freeman, Supreme Court Reporter, the
following communication:

STATE OF ILLINOIS, SUPREME COURT, THIRD GRAND }
DIVISION, CLERK'S OFFICE, Ottawa, Oct. 6, 1869. }

MRS. MYRA BRADWELL--_Madam_: The court instruct me to inform you
that they are compelled to deny your application for a license to
practice as an attorney-at-law in the courts of this State, upon
the ground that you would not be bound by the obligations
necessary to be assumed where the relation of attorney and client
shall exist, by reason of the disability imposed by your married
condition--it being assumed that you are a married woman.

Applications of the same character have occasionally been made by
persons under twenty-one years of age, and have always been
denied upon the same ground that they are not bound by their
contracts, being under a legal disability in that regard.

Until such disability shall be removed by legislation, the court
regards itself powerless to grant your application.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. L. FREEMAN.

The applicant, satisfied that under the common law, as modified
by our statutes, she could not properly be denied a license to
practice law solely upon the ground of her married condition, on
the 18th of November filed the following printed argument:


ADDITIONAL BRIEF.

_In the Supreme Court of Illinois_--_Third Grand
Division_--_September Term, 1869._ [In the matter of the
application of Myra Bradwell to obtain a license to practice as
an Attorney-at-law.] And now again comes the said Myra Bradwell,
it having been suggested to her that the court had assumed that
she is a married woman, and therefore queried whether this would
not prevent her from receiving a license, and files this her
additional brief.

Your petitioner admits to your honors that she is a married woman
(although she believes that fact does not appear in the record),
but insists most firmly that under the laws of Illinois it is
neither a crime nor a disqualification to be a married woman.

I propose to state very briefly,

1. What is an attorney?

2. Who may act as attorneys?

3. The rights and powers of married women in relation to their
business and property under the common law.

4. Their rights and powers as to transacting business under the
recent statutes of our State, with reference to their transacting
business in their own names and acting as attorneys.

5. The avenues of trade and the professions opened to women by
the liberal enactments of the law-makers, and the construction of
the courts.

6. How the Legislature has regarded petitioner with reference to
her rights to carry on business in her own name and act for
herself.

I. WHAT IS AN ATTORNEY?--An attorney is "one who takes the turn
or place of another."--_Webster._ "An attorney at-law," says
Bouvier, "is an officer in a court of justice who is employed by
a party in a cause to manage the same for him." All attorneys are
agents. They transact business, and appear for, and in the place
of their clients who have not the requisite learning, time, or
desire to appear in suits for themselves.

Mr. Story, in his work upon "Agency," and Mr. Bouvier, in his
"Institutes," in treating of the different kinds of agents, both
speak first of attorneys-at-law. All the elementary writers upon
law tell us that attorneys are agents. Without reference to our
recent statutes modifying the common law, we will open the books
and see who may be attorneys or agents.

II. WHO MAY BE ATTORNEYS OR AGENTS.--Mr. Story, in his work on
Agency, says, sec. 7:

Secondly, who are capable of becoming agents? And here it
may be stated that there are few persons who are excluded
from acting as agents, or from exercising an authority
delegated to them by others. Therefore, it is by no means
necessary for a person to be _sui juris_ or capable of
acting in his or her own right, in order to qualify himself
or herself to act for others. Thus, for example, monks,
infants, _femes covert_, persons attainted, outlawed, or
excommunicated villains, and aliens, may be agents for
others.... A _feme covert_ may be an attorney of another, to
make livery to her husband upon a feoffment; and a husband
may take such livery to his wife, although they are
generally deemed but one person in law. She may also act as
agent or otherwise of her own husband, and as such, with his
consent, bind him by her contract, or other act; or she may
act as the agent of another, in a contract, with her own
husband.

III. UNDER THE COMMON LAW.--In Cox _vs._ Kitchin, 1 Bos. & Pul.,
438, where a _feme covert_ represented herself falsely to the
tradesman to be a _feme sole_, and obtained goods on credit, it
was held that she rendered herself personally responsible.

In Derry _vs._ Mazarine, 1 Ld. Raymond, 147, it was held that the
wife of an alien, who was doing business in her own name, in
England, was liable as a _feme sole_. In Hauptman _vs._ Catlin,
20 N. Y., 248, the Court of Appeals says:

Even before the late statute respecting married women, they
were regarded as _femes sole_ in respect to their separate
property, and were as to such property liable on their
contracts respecting the same, to the same extent and as
though they were not under the disability of coverture. It
was held by Lord Mansfield and his associates, in Corbett
_vs._ Poelnitz, 1 T. R., 5, that if a husband and wife
choose to separate, and the husband allows the wife a
separate maintenance, she may contract and be sued as though
she were unmarried, and may be held to bail and imprisoned
on a _ca. sa._ without her husband. The court made this
innovation on the ground that "the times alter new customs,
and new manners arise, which require new exceptions, and a
different application of the general rule.

IV. UNDER THE RECENT STATUTES.--In Conway _vs._ Smith and Wife,
13 Wis., 125, the court held that "the statute gives to married
women, as necessarily incidental to the power of holding property
to their own use, the power of making all contracts necessary or
convenient to its beneficial enjoyment, and such contracts are to
be regarded as valid in law, and may be enforced by legal
remedies." Cole, J., dissenting.

In Barton _vs._ Beer, 35 Barbour, 81, the court, in treating of
the liability of a married woman, says:

If she acts as a _feme sole_, she ought, in justice to the
public, to be subjected to all the duties and liabilities of
a _feme sole_.

In Emerson _vs._ Clayton, 32 Ill., 493, this honorable court
held, that a married woman might bring replevin in her own name,
for her separate property, against a third party, or even against
her own husband, and that the act designed to make and did make a
radical and thorough change in the condition of a _feme covert_;
that she is to be regarded as unmarried, so far as her separate
property is concerned.

In Pomeroy _vs._ Manhattan Life Insurance Co., 40 Ill., 398,
Walker, C.



Pages: | Prev | | 1 | | 2 | | 3 | | 4 | | 5 | | 6 | | 7 | | 8 | | 9 | | 10 | | 11 | | 12 | | 13 | | 14 | | 15 | | 16 | | 17 | | 18 | | 19 | | 20 | | 21 | | 22 | | 23 | | 24 | | 25 | | 26 | | 27 | | 28 | | 29 | | 30 | | 31 | | 32 | | 33 | | 34 | | 35 | | 36 | | 37 | | 38 | | 39 | | 40 | | 41 | | 42 | | 43 | | 44 | | 45 | | 46 | | 47 | | 48 | | 49 | | 50 | | 51 | | 52 | | 53 | | 54 | | 55 | | 56 | | 57 | | 58 | | 59 | | 60 | | 61 | | 62 | | 63 | | 64 | | 65 | | 66 | | 67 | | 68 | | 69 | | 70 | | 71 | | 72 | | 73 | | 74 | | 75 | | 76 | | 77 | | 78 | | 79 | | 80 | | 81 | | 82 | | 83 | | 84 | | 85 | | 86 | | 87 | | 88 | | 89 | | 90 | | 91 | | 92 | | 93 | | 94 | | 95 | | 96 | | 97 | | 98 | | 99 | | 100 | | 101 | | 102 | | 103 | | 104 | | 105 | | 106 | | 107 | | 108 | | 109 | | 110 | | 111 | | 112 | | 113 | | 114 | | 115 | | 116 | | 117 | | 118 | | 119 | | 120 | | 121 | | 122 | | 123 | | 124 | | 125 | | 126 | | 127 | | 128 | | 129 | | 130 | | 131 | | 132 | | 133 | | 134 | | 135 | | 136 | | 137 | | 138 | | 139 | | 140 | | 141 | | 142 | | 143 | | 144 | | 145 | | 146 | | 147 | | 148 | | 149 | | 150 | | 151 | | 152 | | 153 | | 154 | | 155 | | 156 | | 157 | | 158 | | 159 | | 160 | | 161 | | 162 | | 163 | | 164 | | 165 | | 166 | | 167 | | 168 | | 169 | | 170 | | 171 | | 172 | | 173 | | 174 | | 175 | | 176 | | 177 | | 178 | | 179 | | 180 | | 181 | | 182 | | 183 | | 184 | | 185 | | 186 | | 187 | | 188 | | 189 | | 190 | | 191 | | 192 | | 193 | | 194 | | 195 | | 196 | | 197 | | 198 | | 199 | | 200 | | 201 | | 202 | | 203 | | 204 | | 205 | | 206 | | 207 | | 208 | | 209 | | 210 | | 211 | | 212 | | 213 | | 214 | | 215 | | 216 | | 217 | | 218 | | 219 | | 220 | | 221 | | 222 | | 223 | | 224 | | 225 | | 226 | | 227 | | 228 | | 229 | | 230 | | 231 | | 232 | | 233 | | 234 | | 235 | | 236 | | 237 | | 238 | | 239 | | 240 | | 241 | | 242 | | 243 | | 244 | | 245 | | 246 | | 247 | | 248 | | 249 | | 250 | | 251 | | 252 | | 253 | | 254 | | 255 | | 256 | | 257 | | 258 | | 259 | | 260 | | 261 | | 262 | | 263 | | 264 | | 265 | | 266 | | 267 | | 268 | | 269 | | 270 | | 271 | | 272 | | 273 | | 274 | | 275 | | 276 | | 277 | | 278 | | 279 | | 280 | | 281 | | 282 | | 283 | | 284 | | 285 | | 286 | | 287 | | 288 | | 289 | | 290 | | 291 | | 292 | | 293 | | 294 | | 295 | | 296 | | 297 | | 298 | | 299 | | 300 | | 301 | | 302 | | 303 | | 304 | | 305 | | 306 | | 307 | | 308 | | 309 | | 310 | | 311 | | 312 | | 313 | | 314 | | 315 | | 316 | | 317 | | 318 | | 319 | | 320 | | 321 | | 322 | | 323 | | 324 | | 325 | | 326 | | 327 | | 328 | | 329 | | 330 | | 331 | | 332 | | 333 | | 334 | | 335 | | 336 | | 337 | | 338 | | 339 | | 340 | | 341 | | 342 | | 343 | | 344 | | 345 | | 346 | | 347 | | 348 | | 349 | | 350 | | 351 | | 352 | | 353 | | 354 | | 355 | | 356 | | 357 | | 358 | | 359 | | 360 | | Next |

N O P Q R S T
U V W X Y Z 

Your last read book:

You dont read books at this site.